Using the data from three waves (1995, 2002 and 2008) of the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP), which covers nine provinces in China, this paper investigates the impact of land tenure security on farmers' labor market outcomes in rural China, especially for women' s labor market behavior. To identify the effect of land tenure security, this paper used difference-in-differences strategy to control for time invariant heterogeneity, and a number of observed time-varying economic characteristics for its validity. The paper finds that in response to more security land rights, both women and men increase their probability of wage employment participation and individual income. 
Based upon the difference-in-differences analysis, we found that land rights security has a positive influence on both women's and men's labor market behavior. In terms of the pre -policy average, employment increases 6.6 percent for women and 4.6 percent for men, and off-farm employment increases 39.4 percent for women and 29.4 percent for men. We separate the off-farm work to wage employment and self-employment. It reveals that the overall effect on off-farm work was due to an increase in wage employment, as there is an increase of 31.8 percent for women and 23.9 percent for men in wage employment with respect to the pre -reform average. Correspondingly, the impact of the policy on farmers' wage income and individual total income also increases, as the individual total income increased by 36.9 percent for women and 19.8 percent for men after the policy.
The lesson from this paper is that off-farm employment, especially wage employment, is shown to be highly correlated with the RLCL. Because of these relationships, it seems that the government should continue its policies to insure farmers' land security rights and encourage land rental. The finding has important policy implications: with the expansion of land rental markets, we should expect to see an expansion in China' s off-farm employment and a decline in the rural-urban income gap due to more wage income earned by farmers. The increased employment rate and individual income for women have positive implications for the wellbeing of women, which may increase women`s economic empowerment and ability to influence the intra household.
This paper makes three specific contributions to the literature. Our analysis is on the issue of land rights insecurity in developing countries. While most of the literature has focused on the impact of land rights on investment and productivity, less is known about its effect on household decision making such as migration or employment decisions. An additional contribution of this paper is to shed light on an alternative way in which land tenure may affect household welfare, that is, by encouraging women to be engaged in off-farm activities with higher income return relative to farm work, the RLCL may increase women' s economic empowerment and their ability to influence intra household decisions. This study also contributes to the literature on China and labor market transition, in particular in rural areas, by empirically exploring the impact of rural land tenure and off-farm employment. This issue is relevant for the Chinese case due to the rapid increase in off-farm employment, particularly for women. This was experienced during the last three decades, a period which also involved major institutional changes in land arrangements. Although this topic is highly important, the empirical research is still scarce.
I. Introduction

Context of the study
Household Responsibility System and land security rights in China
Before the land tenure reform in 1978, China carried out collective farming, which was characterized by collective ownership and unified collective operation. Property rights were centrally controlled, and the most severe problem with collective farming was inefficiency.
The HRS had implemented in rural China in 1979 and was essentially completed by the end of 1983 (Lin,1992) . Under the HRS, landholdings were distributed among households in a substantially egalitarian fashion (Burgess, 1998) . Practically no rural households were landless (Zhang, 2001 ). Under such an institutional approach, the aim was to provide rural households with secure land use rights in order to increase their incentives to invest and raise their productivity (De La Rupelle, M., Deng, Q., Shi, L., & Vendryes, T., 2009 ). However, land ownership remains in the hands of collective village authorities, therefore, it could not be transferred between households, and land-use rights were contracted to the farmers for a short period of one to two years. In this context, security of rights over land depends mainly on two factors: the village authorities' land management and the contractual status of the plot.
Today, under the framework of the HRS, there are five major tenure types in China, (Brandt, Huang, Li & Scott, 2002) : responsibility land, grain ration land, contract land, private plot and reclaimed land.
Responsibility land is allocated on the basis of the number of family members, the number of laborers in each family, or the desire and ability of the household to engage in agricultural production. Grain ration land is typically allocated on the basis of household size to ensure that each household produces enough for its own consumption needs. The use of the land does not usually entail quotas or other obligations. A small amount of land was provided to rural households for private plots during the period of collective agriculture, and farmers retained this land when China reverted to family farming. Contract land is rented to households by the villages for a fixed cash payment. The length of these contracts varies considerably from community to community. Farmers can also acquire use rights to reclaimed land that was previously uncultivated. There are usually no quotas or fees tied to the use of the land (Brandt, Huang, Li, & Scott, 2002, p.73-74 (Cheng & Tsang, 1996) .
Although the HRS intended to implement the land use rights through a contractual framework, the contracts, in particular, the contract's duration, have not been respected by village collective authorities, who have periodically approved reallocation of land among household villagers. As discussed in Jacoby et al. (2002) , reallocation of lands is promoted by local governments because: first, following the demographic change within households, it helps to keep an egalitarian distribution of land (Kung, 1994) .; second, it reduces the inefficiencies often created by the distribution of land which happens with households' demographic changes, especially in contexts with land rental and labor markets failure (Guo Li, 1999; Benjamin & Brandt, 2000) ; third, it represents for local governments a tool to collect taxes and achieve production quotas .
Periodic land reallocation has created uncertainty in rural households about the durability of land contracts and the risk of land expropriation in the future, thereby discouraging some households to decide to allocate labor to migration, to commit labor to off-farm employment or to rent land.
Rural Land Contracting Law
Realizing that frequent land reallocation and abusive land requisition has led to the insecurity of the land use rights of farmers, the government has taken various action to promote land tenure security (Tao & Xu, 2007) . In 2002, China passed the RLCL into law (Li Ping, 2003) . This law goes beyond previous attempts to secure the land rights of farmers.1 The RLCL requires farmers and collectives be issued with written contracts and certificates to confirm their land use rights. These land contracts have a duration of 30 years. The RLCL focuses on four areas, namely (i) a stricter definition of land rights as property rights rather than just private contracts; (ii) a ban on large-scale reallocations of land and limiting small-scale readjustments with clear conditions; (iii) permitting land transfer between households, and (iv) a commitment to issuance of land documents (Deininger, Jin & Fang, 2012) .
The RLCL provides a legal basis for issues relating to tenure security, marketability, and enforcement of rural household land rights that had previously been dealt with only through administrative means. By giving a legal backing to secure 30-year rights and eliminating the scope for further readjustment of land, the RLCL aims to promote investment, diversification, and productivity. Land rights remain with the household even if some members change their registration status. A second goal of the RLCL is to create a basis for more impersonal transfers of land. Such transfers are of increased relevance to ensure adequate land utilization since, with migration or development of the rural non-farm economy, households respond to non-farm opportunities. For this purpose, the law allows land rights to be exchanged and to be leased, transferred, and assigned to others much more easily than was possible before (Deininger et al., 2004) . The law also emphasizes the equality of men and women, stipulating that in case of marriage, divorce, or death of the husband, the rights to land of the spouses are maintained unless they receive a new land allocation in their new village. , 1995, 2002, 2008) . Land security at village level is measured by means of an indicator that combines information on the share of grain ration land relative to the village total land, and whether or not the village retained some flexible land. Section 4.1 provides details on the data set and the construction of the security land indicator. The table shows a total of 795 villages in 1995, and 847 in 2002, among which there are 33% and 53% of villages, respectively, with higher security land rights. In 2008, the numbers of villages is 271, and the villages with higher security land increased to 91 percent. The statistics summary shows that after the policy change there was an improvement in land security rights across villages. Thus, the empirical analysis in this paper is based on a comparison across time of labor market outcomes for adults in villages with (i.e., treatment group) and without (i.e., comparison group) land security rights.
Research questions and objectives
This paper contributes to this recent but growing literature by analyzing the relationship between land security and off-farm employment in rural China, focusing on women' s behavior. This research issue is relevant because although women have participated in off-farm activities at rates below those of men, participation rates have risen steadily since 1995. In fact, during the period 1995-2011, the participation rate of women in the off-farm sector rose faster than that of men (Li, Huang, Luo, & Liu, 2013) . Therefore, it is important to explore the extent to which the institutional changes in land tenure, which occurred in recent decades, have contributed to explaining this general pattern in off-farm employment of women in rural China.
To explore the link between land security and off-farm employment of women, this study focuses on a major land-policy change in China, the Rural Land Contracting Law (RLCL) which had passed in 2002, sought to improve land right of farmers. The RLCL required farmers and collectives be issued with written contracts and certificates to confirm their land use rights, and the duration of the land contract was to be set at 30 years. One of the consequences of this policy change was the reduction of farmers' risk of losing land rights in future periods due to migration. As a result, incentives encourage men and women in rural households to move into off-farm employment and to derive their income from non-agricultural sources.
To identify the effect of the RLCL on farmers` labor market outcomes, this paper uses a differencein-differences strategy to control for time invariant heterogeneity. The data used for the empirical analysis were derived from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) household survey, for the waves of 1995, 2002 and 2008 . We explore the impacts of land security rights on the following market outcomes:
employment, farm work and off-farm work, wage employment and self-employment, and we also examine four types of income: individual total income, wage income, self-employment income and household income. As highlighted, the main analysis focuses on women' s outcomes in labor market, however, for comparative proposes behavioral response of men to the RLCL is also explored. We found that improvement in land rights security derived from the RLCL has a positive influence on both women' s and men' s labor market behavior. In terms of the pre -policy average, employment increases 5.9 percent for women and 3.9 percent for men, and off-farm employment increases 40 percent for women and 28 percent for men. Individual income and household income is also shown to be correlated with the land reform policy.
This paper contributes to the literature on the issue of land rights insecurity in developing countries.
While most of the literature has focused on the impact of land rights on investment and productivity (e.g., Carter & Yao, 1999; Jacoby, Hanan, Li, Guo & Rozelle, 2002; Deininger & Jin, 2003; Goldstein & Udry, 2008) , less is known about its effect on household decision making as migration (e.g. Mullan, Grosjean & Kontoleon, 2011) or employment decisions. An additional contribution of this paper is to shed light on an alternative way in which land tenure may affect household welfare, that is, by encouraging women to be engaged in off-farm activities with higher income return relative to farm work, the RLCL may increase women`s economic empowerment and their ability to influence intra household decisions.2 In rural China, women, especially those who were married, are considered the group that should stay at home and be committed to caring for the elderly and children, as well as undertake the task of agricultural production (Wang, 1999; Knight & Song, 2003; Chang, MacPhail & Dong, 2011) . Although rising, their labor force participation and income lag behind of men in off-farm employment (Chan & Senser,1997; Solinger,1999; Maurer-Fazio, 1999; Song & Jiggins, 2000; Li, 2001; De Brauw, Huang, Rozelle, Zhang & Zhang, 2002; Shi, Heerink &Qu, 2007) .
This study also contributes to the literature on China and labor market transition, in particular in rural areas, by empirically exploring the impact of rural land tenure and off-farm employment. This issue is relevant for the Chinese case due to the rapid increase in off-farm employment, particularly for women.
This was experienced during the last three decades, a period which also involved major institutional changes in land arrangements. Although this topic is highly important, empirical research is still scarce. For instance, Kung & Lee (2001) and Shi et al., (2007) document that the development of land rental markets has encouraged off-farm employment, however, none of these studies directly analyze the impact of land insecurity on off-farm employment. This is the case of Lohmar (1999) , who seeks to determine whether land insecurity in China deters workers in farm households from off-farm employment, and finds that households in villages with relatively high insecurity are less likely to participate in such types of employment activities. In the present paper, we proceed by using a quasi-experimental design to analyze whether the recent land-policy changes in China, which improved land security rights of farmers, have increased employment in off-farm activities. Our results suggest that the positive impact of these types of policies on off-farm employment, such as the RLCL, could be a factor that explains the increasing tendency observed in the overall employment rate in off-farm activities in China, mainly among women.
II. Literature review
China's rural economy has undergone radical change since the onset of economic reforms in 1978.
The implementation of the Household Responsibility System (HRS) in 1979, which replaced the commune system, significantly improved farmers` work incentives by giving them relative freedom in their productive choices, and granting secure land use rights as a means of promoting productive investment (Rozelle, S., Guo, L., Shen, M., Hughart, A., & Giles, J., 1999). Li et al. (1998) show that in rural China the production behavior of farmers is affected by the type of land tenure and the associated property rights. For instance, the right to use land for long periods of time encourages the use of land-saving investments, while the lack of private property rights can be seen as a hindrance to efficient allocation and use of land (Dong, 1996) . In addition, the emergence of land rental market after almost two decades of rural reforms (Kung, 2002) , and the fact that households-renting-land have achieved higher land productivity than their counterparts, indicate that land rental transactions have increased aggregate agricultural production in China (Lohmar, Zhang & Somwaru, 2001 ).
The increasing productivity of the agricultural sector in rural China, in addition to a decreased demand for labor in this area and an increased wage differential between rural and urban areas, have provided strong incentive for rural labor to shift to off-farm employment in recent decades (Zhao,1999 Mullan et. Al., (2011) analyze the role of incomplete rural property rights in the migration decisions of rural households by using independent-based household surveys and self-reported information on land tenure, and find that tenure insecurity reduces migration. Similar qualitative conclusions arise from the study of Giles and Mu (2014) .
Based on time variation in land reallocation (i.e., a more insecure land arrangement) across villages in 1995 and 2003 period, the authors find that farmers reduced their probability of migrating in response to a higher probability of village-wide land reallocation.
How does the RLCL affect farmers' off-farm employment decisions? Our analysis is based upon the description by Besley (1995) and Mullen, K., P. Grosjean, and A. Kontoleon. (2008) of the link between land rights and investment decisions, who discuss two relevant arguments according to which land management arrangements could influence off-farm choices decisions in the context of China. In particular, the decision by rural households to migrate and participate in outside labor markets.
First, migration is associated with a risk of expropriation since it entails a decrease in household size, which may induce the redistribution of some of the household land in order to maintain egalitarian land holdings . The RLCL impose a ban on large-scale reallocations of land and limited small-scale readjustments. It reduced farmers' worry about their risk of losing land rights at a future time if they decided to migrate to off-farm activities. Second, the development of land exchange rights can affect migration choices (Mullan et. Al., 2011) . The RLCL detailed the right to lease, assign, exchange and carry out other transactions with land contracts. Thus, this policy change was expected to facilitate market transfers and improve the marketability of land rights. Also, an existing and functioning land market can help to transfer land from households with lower marginal productivity to those with higher marginal productivity, allowing a better allocation of household labor between, for example, on-farm and off-farm activities (Riedinger and Yadav, 2009 ).
As consequence of a plausible reduction of barriers to migration out of rural areas, due to the improvement in land security rights as a result of the RLCL, it was expected that the policy change would also have a positive effect on off-farm labor markets. In particular, the main hypothesis to be empirically test in our work is that the improvement in land security rights, due to the RLCL, had a positive effect on overall off-farm employment. However, the incentives of the reform probably heterogeneously affected different categories of workers. Indeed, most of the self-employed individuals were operating small family firms that were labor intensive and used little capital. As a consequence, the risk of land insecurity for firm owners was much higher than for those in the wage-earning sector. Therefore, we expect that the increase in off-farm employment after implementation of RLCL was driven mostly by an increase in wage employment rather than a growth in self-employment.4 Additionally, since the the wage labor market increases rapidly and the trend of self-employment falls, we expect that income from wage employment will rise, and hence, the household income will also increase (Haggblade, Hazell & Reardon, 2010; Du & Park, 2006 ).
Should we expect that both women and men respond similarly to the RLCL? We expect a certain degree of heterogeneity in response by gender, not because either men or women in rural households have faced different incentives from the RLCL, but because probably the propensity to respond is heterogeneous (i.e., because the incidence may vary across groups). While a large reduction of the time spent in agriculture activities with a significant increase in off-farm work have been documented for both men and women, since the land tenure reforms began, the participation rate of men working full-time in agriculture has been lower throughout the 1980s-2000s. There is due to their earlier and larger shift into the off-farm sector. For instance, in the 2000s, men between the ages of 30 and 50 participated in the off-farm labor force at rates more than 40 percent points higher than women (Li et al., 2013) . Thus, this gap in off-farm employment rate may have generated a higher impact of the RLCL on the employment of women in off-farm activities relative to men. Actually, Li et al., (2013) document that the participation rate of women as full-time farm workers have declined faster than that of men during this period, mainly the 1990s, and off-farm participation rate has risen faster for women than for men.
In the remainder of the paper, we will use the discussion above to guide our empirical investigation of the impact of the RLCL on labor market outcomes of both men and women. Specifically, we look at the impacts of improvement in land security rights due to the RLCL on the following outcomes: employment, farm work and off-farm work, and wage employment and self-employment. We also examine the response to the policy change on individual total income, wage income, self-employment income and household income.
III. Methodology and data
Data and sample construction
The empirical analysis in this study is derived from cross-sectional data from the Chinese Household The key variable in our study is a measure for land right security indicating treatment status at village level. Following previous studies (e.g., la Rupelle et al., 2009), we relied on the variation of security rights across villages, depending on each village´s collective management of land. However, an important limitation of constructing a "homogenous" measure for land security is the CHIP questionnaire that asks for this type of information by using different specific questions across the three years of the survey considered for the analysis. To address this issue, in this study we use two comparable-variables to indicate the village-level dimension of security. For the years of1995 and 2002, the land security measure is defined by using a variable which measures the share of grain ration land in total land at the village level. Grain ration land is intended to enable farmers to retain some land "to secure their food supply" (Cheng & Tsang, 1996) . Higher share of grain ration land in total land at the village level means there is more security rights for the village farmers. For the year of 2008, since the (continuous) variable indicating grain rotation is unavailable in the CHIP, the variable we use to measure land security at village level is whether the village has retained some land for adjustment (which is often translated as "flexible land"). The existence of flexible land means that there is room for land reallocation by part of the village leaders, i.e., the farmers have to take into account that their land can be redistributed to other members of the village (Cheng & Tsang, 1996) . Therefore, due to the data restrictions discussed above, we construct the measure for land security at village level, (i.e., a variable for treatment status, as a binary indicator variable). In particular, for the years of 1995 and 2002, the indicator for land security at village level is coded as one if the share of grain ration land in total land at the village-dimension is above the mean value of the year; meanwhile for the year of 2008 it is coded as one if the village retained some flexible land that year.
In order to verify our results are not (strictly) dependent on the information used to construct the land security indicator, we exploit the fact that the variable of "flexible land" for the CHIP2002 is also available, and conduct some robustness exercises. Specifically, we construct "placebo-treatment status" by using the information about flexible land instead of grain rotation for 2002. First, we check the percentage of coincidences in the assignment of villages to treatment by using the original and "placebo" treatment status definition. Results show a high share of coincidence, in the order of 41.91% and 52.54%.
Second, we perform the main estimates shown in the empirical analysis but using the placebo-treatment status definition as an indicator for treatment in the regression specification. The results of this exercise are qualitatively similar to those obtained by using the original definition of treatment, as depicted in table 5 and 6.
Identification assumptions and econometric strategy
The empirical work in this paper aims to identify the causal effect of land security on farmers' labor market outcomes in villages that had higher land security rights since the RLCL was implemented in 2002.
In this paper, the major concern is that those villages that chose improving land security could be different from villages that chose not to improve land security, and that this difference may be correlated with labor market outcomes. If households have more secure land, they can afford to spend more time being engaged in off-farm work . However, many of the unobserved characteristics that may confound identification by using a simpler OLS strategy, not only vary across villages but are fixed over time. For example, such types of time-invariant factors are the preferences of village authorities to redistribute land, at least in a relatively short-time period as that characterized by our analysis.
In order to control for time-invariant unobserved factors, we use a difference-in-differences approach to evaluate the policy's effect (Angrist & Krueger, 1999) , which compares the change in outcomes in the treatment group before and after the RLCL was implemented to the change in outcomes in the control group. The latter group is assumed to capture the counter factual trend for the treatment group which would have been observed in the absence of the policy change. The treatment group consist of individuals aged 16 to 65 in villages that have higher security rights (i.e., the village share of grain ration land in total land is above the mean value for years 1995 and 2002, and there is no flexible land in the collective for the year of 2008). The comparison group consists of individuals in the same age range whose village has land insecurity, as defined above. The empirical analysis therefore compares the off-farm labor market participation of women or men in the village having higher land security with land insecurity. By comparing changes, we control for unobserved time-invariant village characteristics that might be correlated with the land security as well as off-farm employment decision.
The following is the difference-in-difference specification with controls on which most of the estimates in this paper are based:
Where i indexes individuals, j village and t time. The variable Y ijt is one of the outcomes of interest;
land security jt is an indicator variable for villages in the treatment group, coded as one if the village has higher land security and zero otherwise; year95 is a dummy equal to one before the RLCL and zero otherwise; year08 is a dummy equal to one after the RLCL was implemented and zero otherwise; and year08*land security jt is the interaction between the two variables, which captures the difference-indifference treatment effect. Year95*land security jt is the interaction between the variables of year95 and land security jt , which controls for possible different pre -trends between the control and treatment groups.
The X ijt matrix contains individual-specific variables, household and village variables to condition the differences in trends to observable characteristics. The individual covariates include: age, education level, and marital status; the household covariates include: land holding by household measured by the total area used for agricultural activities, asset used for agriculture measured by the balance of family financial assets, and the household demographic composition; finally, controls at village level dimension include the village consumption level and per capital income.6 θ t is a time effect common to all villages in time t, and φ j is a fixed effect unique to the village. The ε ijt is a individual time-varying error.
The analysis is based on the set of labor market outcomes of interest directly related to the expected effects discussed in the section on theoretical predictions. Those outcomes include: overall employment, farm work, off-farm employment, wage employment, and self-employment, and individual and household incomes (i.e., total household incomes, individual total incomes, wage incomes and selfemployment incomes). 7 Through the entire empirical analysis the difference-in-difference results are showed separately for men and women. 6 The variables of income per capita, the balance of family financial assets are discounted by the consumer price index at the provincial level with 1990 as the base year. The price index is obtained from China Statistical Yearbooks of various years. 7 The types of tasks included in each activity are as follows: off-farm work includes time allocated to wage employment in local villages and outside the county, and self-employment activities such as small handicraft and small commercial household businesses; household income is from household operation such as family planting, forestry, husbandry and fishery and nonagriculture operation; Individual total income includes individual total wage income and total non-wage income of individual member. The second identification assumption is that the composition of each group remained constant over the period under study. This assumption would be violated, for instance, if the treatment group expanded over time and incorporated individuals with different characteristics. Although our regression equation includes controls for a broad set of individual and household characteristics, this may not be enough to control for potential differences in group-specific compositional changes over time. In the robustness section we will test whether the possible compositional effect has influenced the results. Table 4 and 5 present the off-farm employment for men and women from 1995 to 2009. These tables show that off-farm employment rates increased largely for both men and women, and this increase is mainly from wage employment as self-employment increased slowly. Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects.
IV. Application and results
Descriptive analysis
Baseline results
Source: CHIP, the following data sources, if not specifically stated, are from CHIP. Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects.
Source: CHIP, the following data sources, if not specifically stated, are from CHIP.
The interaction between land rights security and the year of 2008 dummy captures the effect of being in a land-security-village on off-farm work after the RLCL was implemented, relative to those located in villages with land insecurity. Table 6 land holding by household, asset used for agriculture by household, household demographic variables and village characteristics, which are included but not reported. Since the percent of farmers who work in both activities is low (there are 6.6 percent women and 18 percent men who work both in farm and off-farm activities), we have restricted the analysis to the sample of individuals who engage in one employment only.
The estimates in column 1 of table 6 and 7 present the policy impact on the employment rate for men and women. The coefficient on interaction of the land rights security variable and year dummy of land security* year08 show that both the employment rate of women (5.8 percentage points) and men (4.1 percentage points) increased, and both are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, respectively. In terms of the pre -policy average, the effect represents an increase of 6.6 percent for women and 4.6 percent for men. The variable of land security* year 95 (which captures pre -trends effects) is not statistically significant for women at the usual statistical levels. In contrast, the estimate for men shows the coefficient on this variable is statistically significant at the 10 percent statistical level, suggesting some caution for interpretation. For the rest of the estimates presented in table 7, we cannot reject the null of the coefficient on land security* year 95 that is statistically different of zero.
The estimates in column 2 of table 6 and 7 are the policy effect on farm employment for men and women. It shows that the coefficient of land security* year08 is negative for both women and men, and statistically significant at the 5 percent level for men. The estimates in column 3 correspond to the main outcome of interest, that is, off-farm employment. The results indicate a statistically significant increase in those villages with land-security-land after the RLCL relative to those villages without land security. For off-farm work, there is an increase of 7.1 percent points for women, and an increase of 10 percent points for men, both of them are significant at the 1 percent level. In terms of the pre -policy average, the effect represents an increase of 39.4 percent for women and 29.4 percent for men. Similarly, the variable of land security* year 95 is not statistically significant in the estimations. As the employment has increased significantly for both women and men, we can conclude that the policy effect on off-farm employment seems to be driven by an employment effect for women. For men, the employment on farm decreased significantly. Therefore, the policy effect on off-farm seems to be both a switching effect from farm activities to off-farm and an employment effect.
We then separate the off-farm work to wage employment and self employment. Columns 4 to 5 reveal that the overall effect on off-farm work was due to an increase in wage employment, which is consistent with the discussion in Section 3. For being employed as wage workers, there is an increase of 5.4
percentage points for women (significant at the 5 percent level), and an increase of 7.4 percentage points for men (significant at the 1 percent level). In terms of the pre -policy average, this implies that the effect is representative of an increase of 31.8 percent for women and 23.9 percent for men.
With respect to the participation of self employment, table 6 and 7 show that the sign of the interaction between land rights security and the year of 2008 are both small in magnitude. It is statistically significant at the 10 percent level for women and not statistically significant for men. Overall, the pattern of results in table 6 and 7 indicate that women`s labor market behavior responded to the policy reform as predicted in Section 3. The RLCL is associated with an increase in off-farm employment rates, and the overall effect on off-farm work was due to an increase in wage employment.
In addition, we show that the dependent variables were estimated at village level in table 2. The result is consistent with the conclusions mentioned above. At the same time, the probit estimates of the effect of the RLCL on female and male labor market are shown in table 3 and 4. The main results are qualitatively similar to the regressions which are estimated by the OLS. For simplicity in the interpretation of the coefficients, we decided to report the coefficients as estimated by the OLS.
Heterogeneous effects
Exploring for heterogeneity effects across individuals and households is likely to be important in satisfactorily explaining their off-farm activities. In fact, households and individuals' abilities in farm and non-farm activities and opportunities can differ considerably and could explain some labor reallocation from farm to off-farm sectors. Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects.
Source: CHIP, the following data sources, if not specifically stated, are from CHIP. Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects. Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects.
We examine which groups of individuals are particularly affected by land tenure security. First, we stratify the sample into two groups based on age. The results presented in table 8 and 9, reveal that the impact on off-farm work and wage employment is significant and larger for men and women older than 26.
Second, when stratification is carried out by educational attainment, we find strong evidence that the less educated are affected, as shown in table 10 and 11. We find a stronger effect of land tenure security on the labor market behavior of older people and of those with a low level of education. The result is consistent with the evidence of Giles and Mu (2014) on the labor supply responses to land security rights. Third, we stratify the sample by wage employment and self employment in their local county and outside of their hometown. The indicator for wage employment by local county is coded as one if the person is engaged in wage employment within the province, and as zero if the person participates in farm or self employment activities, or the place of wage employment is outside of the province. For the variable of wage employment outside of the hometown, it is coded as one if the place where the person is engaged in wage employment is out of the province, and zero otherwise. The variable of self employment in the local county or outside of the hometown is defined in the same way. As shown in table 12 and 13, there are 4.2 percentage points for women and 7 percentage points for men, participating in the local wage labor market.
These effects are significant at the 5 percent level for women and the 1 percent level for men, which, in terms of the pre -policy average, implies that the effect represents an increase of 52.5 percent for women and 43.75 percent for men in the local wage labor market. With respect to self employment, there is a significant increase in local self employment for men, but the effect is not statistically significant for women. The results are in line with evidence from the National Bureau of Statistics the number of interprovincial migrants is decreasing, and the number of local off-farm workers is increasing.8 Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects. Source: CHIP, the following data sources, if not specifically stated, are from CHIP. 
RLCL effects on income
No. obs. 31580
Dependent variable mean 3.895 2.708 0.611 Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects.
Source: CHIP, the following data sources, if not specifically stated, are from CHIP. Table 14 , 15, and 16 show the effect of the RLCL on individuals and household incomes (income is expressed in logarithm form). The results show individual total income increased by 36.9 percent for women and 19.8 percent for men after the policy, and these effects are both statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Correspondingly, the impact of the policy on wage income and self employment income is also consistent with the labor market outcomes. Both men`s and women`s wage income increased significantly; there is a 36.6 percent increase for women, and a 25.1 percent increase for men. Similarly, the impact on income from self employment is also not significant. As expected, with regards to the household income variable, the sign of the coefficient is positive. The income increases by 2 percent, and this is significant at the 1 percent level.
In conclusion, the response patterns for labor market outcomes and income are in line with the predicted effects of the reform. They are also consistent with the existing evidence on the labor supply responses to land security rights (la Rupelle et al., 2009; Mullan et.al., 2011; Giles & Mu, 2014) . The coefficient of the interaction term shows that land rights security acts as an impetus for participating in offfarm work and wage work for women and men. This also reveals that land endowments are still an important factor in household migration decisions.
Robustness
The following section present the robustness tests on the difference-in-differences estimates presented in the previous section. These exercises are based on the model of equation, with full controls for individual characteristics, household characteristics and county-fixed effects, as in the previous analysis.
The estimates on the previous regression analysis show that the coefficient on the interaction between land rights security and the year of 1995 dummy variable is insignificant statistically for (almost) all of the estimated models. This reflects that possible trends which affect treatment and control groups differently are not present in the setting; i.e. there is no significant evidence that we can reject the parallel trends before the policy reform assumption. 
No. obs. 28813
Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects.
A further concern for the identification strategy is that the treatment and comparison groups may have changed over the period under study, confounding treatment with composition effects. The summary statistics and the unconditional difference-in-differences estimates in table 2 and 3 indicate that the main individual characteristics of both groups did not change substantially before and after the policy change, but the household characteristics of both groups changed a lot. We include the interaction terms between the land security indicator and the full set of control covariates in the regression. Results in table 17 and 18 indicate that the main estimates are also robust for this alternative. The estimated coefficients for the main outcomes are somewhat smaller than the baseline results in table 6 and 7, but they remain significant at the usual confidence levels.
In general, the robustness tests suggest that changes in the composition of the treatment and comparison groups did not introduce a spurious correlation between changes in the outcomes before and after the reform.
Finally, an additional concern is related to the form in which we computed the standard errors of estimated regression. In particular, as the dependent variable in regression models varies across individuals within villages, a certain degree of correlation between the outcomes of individuals belonging to the same village could be expected, and thus affect the coefficient standard errors. In order to check the extent to which this issue could affect the inference in our setting, table 7 and 8 in the Annex section replicate our main results in tables 6 and 7 by clustering standard errors at village level. As can be seen in those tables, the results remain basically unchanged.
V. Conclusions and policy implications
In the paper, we investigate the effect of land rights security on labor market behavior. Until the early 2000s, farmers in rural China faced a substantial level of risk of losing land in village land reallocations.
In 2002, China passed the Rural Land Contracting Law, which aim to secure the land rights of farmers. How does the RLCL affect farmers` labor market behavior? Based upon the difference-in-differences analysis, we found that land rights security has a positive influence on both women's and men's labor market behavior. In terms of the pre -policy average, employment increases 6.6 percent for women and 4.6 percent for men, and off-farm employment increases 39.4 percent for women and 29.4 percent for men.
We separate the off-farm work to wage employment and self employment. It reveals that the overall effect on off-farm work was due to an increase in wage employment, as there is an increase of 31.8 percent for women and 23.9 percent for men in wage employment with respect to the pre -reform average.
Correspondingly, the impact of the policy on farmers` wage income and individual total income also increases, as the individual total income increased by 36.9 percent for women and 19.8 percent for men after the policy.
The lesson from this paper is that off-farm employment, especially wage employment, is shown to be highly correlated with the RLCL. Because of these relationships, it seems that the government should continue its policies to insure farmers` land security rights and encourage land rental. The finding has important policy implications: with the expansion of land rental markets, we should expect to see an expansion in China`s off-farm employment and a decline in the rural-urban income gap due to more wage income earned by farmers. The increased employment rate and individual income for women have positive implications for the wellbeing of women, which may increase women`s economic empowerment and ability to influence the intra household.
Nonetheless, the conclusions from the present study require some qualification. First, considering the time variation was used in the study for identification, the RLCL was probably also accompanied by many other policy changes, that are also likely to have affected labor market decisions. We cannot disentangle the potential relative effects in the setting. Second, the period in which the RLCL was approved in China coincided with a historic economic boom, making it difficult to determine the extent to which the changes in labor market behavior due to the economic upturn could have affected our results. This caveat might be exacerbated by the unavailability of additional years of (CHIP) data to better-control for possible confounding factors. Despite these limitations, the robustness results and the virtual non-existence of pre -trends on labor market outcomes (even with the small number of pre -reform data considered) allow us to be confident about the results. Finally, it is important to consider that estimates of the impact of the RLCL on labor market outcomes in our study is not based on any data in which land security was literally absent. The identification strategy is based on the level of land security across villages-time, so the estimated coefficient of impact cannot be interpreted as treatment on the treated parameters. Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. Source: CHIP, the following data sources, if not specifically stated, are from CHIP. Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects. Source: CHIP, the following data sources, if not specifically stated, are from CHIP. Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects. Source: CHIP, the following data sources, if not specifically stated, are from CHIP. 
No. obs. 28813
Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; Each regression result be showed with 2002 and 2008 data by using both types of definitions of treatment. Source: CHIP, the following data sources, if not specifically stated, are from CHIP. No. obs.
28,813
Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects. Source: CHIP, the following data sources, if not specifically stated, are from CHIP. No. obs.
31,580
Notes: (.): Standard error; significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels; respectively. Each regression also includes the intercept, individual age and education level, land used by the household in log form, family financial assets in log form, village per capita income in log form, village consumption level in log form and county fixed effects. Source: CHIP, the following data sources, if not specifically stated, are from CHIP.
